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ARTICLES 
The Polyphonic Courtroom: 
Expanding the Possibilities of Judicial 
Discourse 
Robert Rubinson * 
"[T]o get somewhere with the matter at hand is to intensify the 
suspicion, both your own and that of others, that you are not 
quite getting it right."! 
I. Introduction 
In a matter of such profound importance as the justification for 
imposing judicial power, few would deny the normative goal of 
maintaining as open a discourse as possible. As one means to an 
open discourse, scholars have increasingly turned to the transforma-
tive power of "dialogue" to explore new legal meaning.2 
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1. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 29 (1973). 
2. See, e.g., Stephen M. Feldman, The Persistence of Power and the Struggle for Dia-
logic Standards in Postmodern Constitutional Jurisprudence: Michelman, Habermas, and Civic 
Republicanism, 81 GEO. L.J. 2243 (1993); Dennis Patterson, PostmodernismlFeminismlLaw, 
77 CORNELL L. REV. 254 (1992); Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 
409, 434 (1990). 
3 
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However, the central instrument for elaborating legal doctrine, 
the judicial opinion, is a paradigm of closed discourse. As a 
general rule, judicial opinions embody what Robert Ferguson has 
called the "the rhetoric of inevitability.,,3 In other words, the vast 
majority of opinions are written like briefs with the chosen result 
as a client. An opinion will perfunctorily dismiss or diminish 
alternative analyses, present facts as determinate and finite when 
in fact they are carefully chosen to present a given story, articulate 
standards in a manner favorable to the result and turn to other 
standard methods of advocacy that students learn in their first year 
of law schoo1.4 Stated more broadly, opinions are typically 
monologues which reject exploration of complex issues of meaning 
in favor of the simple exercise of justifying a result.s 
The consequences of this cramped state of judicial discourse 
are profound and disturbing. The prevailing model offers judges 
no incentive to openly explore meaning because of the operating 
fiction that there is no meaning to be explored, only the "right" 
meaning to be articulated and explained.6 Opinions thus ignore 
how adjudication often entails hard choices among multiple 
perspectives, each of which might have a vital, independent force.7 
As a result, the actual considerations and range of choices available 
3. Robert A. Ferguson, The Rhetorics of the Judicial Opinion: The Judicial Opinion as 
Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201,213 (1990). 
4. For an extensive discussion by a judge of the techniques judges use to convince the 
reader of the inevitability of a result, see Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the 
Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1995). 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 70-89. 
6. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 4, at 1417 ("while judges still typically write as if they 
were absolutely certain about the rightness and soundness of their analysis and decisions, 
everyone (including the judges) knows that's not necessarily the case"): Richard A. Posner, 
Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1441 (1995). 
According to Posner, 
Judges are not comfortable writing opinions to the effect that, "We have very little 
sense of what is going on in this case. The record is poorly developed, and the 
lawyers are lousy. We have no confidence that we got it right. We know we're 
groping in the dark. But we're paid to decide cases and here goes." Nevertheless, 
this is the actual character of many appellate cases that are decided in published 
opinions. 
[d. (citations omitted). 
7. Robert Cover's work is particularly insightful in setting out ways in which judges 
avoid confronting painful choices their role demands of them. See ROBERT M. COVER, 
JUSTICE ACCUSED 232-36 (1975). 
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to judges remain concealed-a loss that impoverishes the elabora-
tion of legal meaning.8 
The consequences of the monologic tendency, however, run 
much deeper, extending even to the act of judicial decision-making 
itself. By failing to explore meaning, opinions do not merely 
conceal choices from readers, but mask (to quote Holmes) judges' 
own "instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions" from the 
judges themselves.9 In other words, monologic opinions promote 
monologic ways of thinking, and monologic ways of thinking inhibit 
discourse. 
The working hypothesis of this Article is that this state of 
affairs is neither desirable nor inevitable. Another normative 
conception of judicial discourse, the "polyphonic model," holds that 
a judicial opinion is part of a continuing dialogue whose hallmark 
is exploration, not simplification. Under this model, opinions 
should embrace dialogue and complexity, and recognize the 
independent validity of multiple perspectives. Such opinions would 
elaborate, not restrict and reduce, meaning. 
However, the recognition of the merits of this approach is only 
a first step towards realizing it. Obstacles remain because cognition 
itself simplifies meaning, and thus it takes more than simple will to 
write and think more polyphonically. Nevertheless, these cognitive 
constraints themselves suggest potential strategies that could 
intensify dialogue and thereby expand the scope of judicial 
discourse. 
This Article explores these issues in four parts. Part II draws 
upon the writings of Mikhail Bakhtin in order to set forth a 
conceptual framework through which to examine judicial discourse. 
Part III conceptualizes judicial discourse as primarily monologic 
and develops polyphony as a more suitable normative goal. This 
part also examines representative judicial opinions which exemplify 
both monologic and polyphonic approaches to judicial discourse. 
Part IV explores cognitive obstacles to the recognition of a 
8. Indeed, there are increasing numbers of critiques of the "rhetoric" or "style" of 
judicial opinions. For an overview of recent scholarship in this area, see the Special Issue 
of the University of Chicago Law Review on "Judicial Opinion Writing." 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1363-1520 (1995). See also Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term Foreword: 
The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 30, 117 (1993). 
9. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (1881). 
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polyphonic ideal. Finally, Part V suggests approaches that would 
promote a more pluralistic, polyphonic model of judicial discourse. 
Throughout this Article, I will focus my analysis on the 
adjudication of "hard cases"IO in the United States Supreme 
Court. I emphasize opinions of the Supreme Court not because 
they present the only area where the scope of judicial discourse is 
limited, but because they present an area where polyphonic 
discourse is both distinctly lacking and urgently needed. 
II. The Monologic and the Polyphonic 
The work of Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin (1895-1975) offers 
a powerful descriptive and normative framework through which to 
view the current state of judicial discourse.ll Like many other 
modern and post-modern thinkers, Bakhtin was concerned 
preeminently with how language embodies and expresses meaning. 
What is especially striking about Bakhtin's work, however, and 
what renders it especially relevant to an examination of judicial 
discourse, is his "extraordinary sensitivity to the immense plurality 
of experience.,,12 It is this understanding that forms the founda-
tion for one of Bakhtin's central themes: meaning is in a perpetual 
10. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 39-40 (1986). 
11. Bakhtin's influence extends to "philosophy, semiotics, cultural studies, anthropology, 
feminist and post-colonial studies, Marxism, [and] ethics." Pam Morris, Introduction to 
MIKHAIL MIKHAILOVICH BAKlITIN, PAVEL NIKOLAEVICH MEDVEDEV & VALENTIN 
NIKILAEVICH VOLOSHINOV, THE BAKlITIN READER 1 (Pam Morris ed., 1994). Surprisingly 
few legal scholars have explicitly drawn on Bakhtin'S ideas. For some exceptions, see Milner 
S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2280 (1989); 
Ferguson, supra note 3; Charles Hersch, Bakhtin and Dialogic Constitutional Interpretation, 
18 LEGAL STUD. F. 33 (1994); JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE 
RHETORIC AND POETICS OF LAW 107-37 (1985). 
Bakhtin's work has only become widely known since the late 1970's. This relatively 
recent discovery is due to, among other things, his imprisonment by Soviet authorities and 
his own persistent uninterest in preserving his work in book or article form. Michael 
Holquist, Introduction to M.M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION, xv, xxiv-xxv 
(Michael Holquist ed., 1980). To add further complexity, it is unclear whether some 
important early writings are the work of Bakhtin or of two other thinkers, P.N. Medvedev 
and V.N. Voloshinov, in his circle. For a recent discussion of this controversy, see Morris, 
supra, at 2-4. For purposes of this article, I will cite to works which are provisionally 
attributed to Medvedev and Voloshinov, but I will continue to refer to the ideas as Bakhtin's 
in the text. 
12. Holquist, supra note 11, at xx. This distinguishes Bakhtin from other influential 
participants-such as Wittgenstein-of the so-called "linguistic tum" of twentieth-century 
philosophy. Id. See also MIKHAIL BAKlITIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOYEVSKY'S POETICS 26 
(Caryl Emerson ed. & trans., 1984) [hereinafter PDP]. 
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state of "becoming.,,13 Language is not the carrier of final truths, 
but a means to present "a working hypothesis for comprehending 
and expressing reality.,,14 
A. The Process and Content of Dialogue 
Bakhtin's famous elaboration of the terms "dialogue" and 
"dialogic" embodies the dynamic patterns of meaning that he 
envisioned. To Bakhtin, "dialogue" is much more than a conversa-
tion. Rather, all understanding is dialogic because understanding 
is by its nature responsive;15 we elaborate meaning by "lay[ing] 
down a set of our own answering words" in response to the words 
of others.16 This dialogic process not only describes social dis-
course, but also how we elaborate meaning in our own individual 
13. PDP, supra note 12, at 251. 
14. M.M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION 61 (Michael Holquist ed. & Caryl 
Emerson & Michael Holquist trans. 1981) [hereinafter DIl. 
15. V.N. VOLOSHINOV, MARXISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 102 (Ladislav 
Matjejka & I.R. Titunick trans., 1973). 
16. [d. 
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consciousness.17 In this sense, dialogue is not merely a way to 
understanding, but is understanding. IS 
Given that understanding is dialogic, the elaboration of 
meaning is an extraordinarily complex process. Any utterance 
comes from "another's voice and filled with that other voice," and 
"enters [the hearer's] context from another context, permeated with 
the interpretations of others.,,19 Stated another way, meaning 
"must find itself, reveal itself among other words, within an intense 
field of interorientations.,,2o 
Bakhtin links up this conception of the elaboration of meaning 
with the "immense plurality of experience." Individual experience, 
based upon, among many other things, "parent, clan, class, religion, 
country,,,21 is in flux over time and is unique at any given time.22 
While communication of course entails a measure of mutual 
17. PDP, supra note 12, at 18, 261. Bakhtin cites an example from the work of 
Dostoyevsky that illustrates the dialogic nature of individual consciousness. The text is from 
POOR FOLK, Dostoyevsky's first novel, and represents the internal thoughts of the narrator 
Makar Devushkin: 
A day or two ago, in private conversation, Yevstafy Ivanovich said that the most 
important virtue in a citizen was to earn money. He said in jest (I know it was in 
jest) that morality consists in not being a burden to anyone. Well, I'm not a 
burden to anyone. My crust of bread is my own; it is true it is a plain crust of 
bread, at times a dry one; but there it is, earned by my toil and put to lawful and 
irreproachable use. Why, what can one do? I know very well, of course, that I 
don't do much by copying; but all the same I am proud of working and earning 
my bread in the sweat of my brow. 
Id. at 207. Bakhtin points out that this single voice contains "an overlapping and merging" 
dialogue and illustrates his point by transforming this "monologue" into a more conventional 
"dialogue": 
THE OTHER: One must know how to earn a lot of money. One shouldn't be a 
burden to anyone. But you are a burden to others. 
MAKAR DEVUSHKIN: I'm not a burden to anyone. I've got my own piece of 
bread. 
THE OTHER: But what a piece of bread it is! Today it's there, and tomorrow 
it's gone. And it's probably a dry one, at that! 
MAKAR DEVUSHKIN: It is true it is a plain crust of bread, at times a dry one, 
but there it is, earned by my toil and put to lawful and irreproachable use. 
THE OTHER: But what kind of toil! All you do is copy. You're not especially 
capable of anything else. 
MAKAR DEVUSHKIN: Well, what can one do! I know very well, of course, 
that I don't do much by copying, but all the same I am proud of it. 
[d. at 210. 
18. Id. at 40, 252. 
19. [d. at 202. 
20. Id. at 239. 
21. Wayne C. Booth, Introduction to MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, in PDP, supra note 12, at xxi. 
22. DJ, supra note 14, at 271. 
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understanding, the plurality of experience insures that contradic-
tions and complexities shoot through language: 
[A]t any given moment of its historical existence, language is 
heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence 
of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the 
past, between differing epochs of the past, between different 
socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, 
schools, circles, and so forth.23 
In other words, ideas from diverse sources interact both within 
individuals and among individuals, and it is this dialogue that 
elaborates meaning.24 
Three important and related implications flow from this 
conceptualization of meaning. First, meaning is not unitary. 
Rather, it depends upon a unique set of conditions (i.e., the 
"context") which exists at the actual time of utterance. Context 
includes both a temporal dimension (i.e. the historical point in time 
of the utterance) as well as a synchronic dimension (for example, 
an individual's "parents, clan, class" at a given point in time). This 
complex array of sociological, ideological and historical factors 
determines the parameters of dialogue and thus informs mean-
ing.25 
Second, ideas are never "closed-off" or "finalized," but 
transform and renew themselves through a constant interaction 
with other ideas.26 Finally, meaning cannot be "abstract" or 
23. Id. at 291. Bakhtin characterizes these processes as embodying a tension between 
centrifugal and centripetal forces. Centrifugal forces, originating in political and cultural 
influences, centralize and unify meaning. Id. at 271-72. Centripetal forces, originating in the 
"immense plurality of experience", decentralize meaning. Id. Meaning is thus dynamic: 
Alongside the centripetal forces, the centrifugal forces of language carry on their 
uninterrupted work; alongside verbal-ideological centralization and unification, the 
uninterrupted processes of decentralization and disunification go forward. 
Id. at 272. 
24. Stanley Fish's notion of "interpretive communities" captures something of the 
essence of this idea in a different way. Fish believes that "each of us is a member of not one 
but innumerable interpretive communities in relation to which different kinds of belief are 
operating with different weight and force." STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES 
NATURALLY 30 (1989). Fish describes this idea in relation to himself: "I am, among other 
things, white, male, a teacher, a literary critic, a student of interpretation, a member of a law 
faculty, a father, a son, an uncle, a husband (twice), a citizen, a (passionate) consumer, a 
member of the middle class, a Jew, the oldest of four children, a cousin, a brother, a brother-
in-law, a son-in-law, a Democrat, short, balding, fifty, an easterner who has been a westerner 
and is now a southerner, a voter, a neighbor, an optimist, a department chairman." Id. 
25. DI, supra note 14, at 271-72, 291. 
26. Id. at 276. See also NIKOLAEAVICH & VOLOSHINOV, supra note 11, at 85-87. 
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"neutral" because all words are "shot through" with "context" and 
"intention. ,,27 
Thus, in Bakhtin's view, language cannot present immutable 
truths or finalized ideas. What we call "conclusions" are at best 
provisional and contingent hypotheses embodied in language. 
B. Monologic and Polyphonic Discourse 
In addition to describing the elaboration of meaning, Bakhtin's 
ideas have an intense normative dimension as well. In exploring 
this normative dimension, Bakhtin introduced two terms: the 
prevailing mode of approaching meaning is "monologic," while his 
normative ideal is "polyphonic.,,28 These terms describe both 
ways of thinking and ways of expressing.29 
A mono logic view rejects the open-ended dialogic nature of 
meaning in favor of a unitary and finalized sense of the world. 
This sense of the world tends to be framed in terms of "the spirit 
of a nation, the spirit of a people, [or] the spirit of history.,,3o 
Thus, monologism reduces multiple perspectives "to a single 
ideological common denominator.,,31 For example, in a monologic 
novel, while characters might speak to each other or have distinct 
characterizations, they only interact "in the unified field of vision 
of author, director and audience, against the clearly defined 
background of a single-tiered world.'>32 There is no "plurality of 
consciousness" and each character is "predetermined, closed-off, 
finalized. ,,33 
Bakhtin vividly describes the consequences of this regime: 
All that has the power to mean, all that has value, is every-
where concentrated around one center-the carrier. All 
ideological creative acts are conceived and perceived as possible 
27. OI, supra note 14, at 293. This idea highlights the difference between Bakhtin's 
thought and Jilrgen Habermas' notion of "discourse ethics." While Habermas grounds 
discourse ethics on "intersubjective discourse," he ultimately seeks to create non-contextual, 
universal principles of morality. See Jiirgen Habermas, Morality and Ethical Life: Does 
Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 38 (1989). Although 
Habermas expressly disclaims that his approach is monologic, in Bakhtinian terms, it is 
profoundly so, as would any attempt to ground meaning independent of context. 
28. PDP, supra note 12, at 80-82. 
29. [d. at 88. 
30. [d. at 82. 
31. [d. at 17. 
32. [d. 
33. PDP, supra note 12, at 17-18. 
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expressions of a single consciousness, a single spmt. ... 
Everything capable of meaning can be gathered together in one 
consciousness and subordinated to a unified accent; whatever 
does not submit to such a reduction is accidental and unessen-
tial. ... Semantic unity of any sort is everywhere represented 
by a single consciousness and a single point of view.34 
11 
In contrast to the mono logic mode, the ideal of "polyphony" 
performs "a small-scale Copernican revolution" by rejecting an 
abstract and fixed external position.35 Instead, polyphony embra-
ces "[a] plurality of independent and unmerged voices and 
consciousness, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices. ,,36 For 
example, in a polyphonic novel, voices stand "alongside" that of the 
author and are not submerged within it.37 In addition, "there are 
no detached, impersonal verities," no "thoughts ... which, when 
removed from their context and detached from their voice, would 
retain their semantic meaning in an impersonal form.,,38 
Moreover, polyphony entails an active embrace of dialogue 
and experience. "[T]o think" for a polyphonic author "means to 
question and to listen, to try out new orientations, to combine some 
and expose others. ,,39 This mode embodies a "distrust of convic-
tions,,,4Q a seeking out not only of "the loud, recognized, reigning 
voices of the epoch," but also "ideas not yet fully emerged, latent 
ideas heard as yet by no one but himself, and ideas . . . just 
beginning to ripen, embryos of future worldviews.,,41 Thus, the 
34. [d. at 81-82. 
35. [d. at 49. 
36. [d. at 6. 
37. [d. 
38. PDP, supra note 12, at 95-96. Bakhtin cites many examples of polyphonic writing 
from Dostoyevsky. To take a brief example, in THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV, Ivan 
experiences an internal dialogue regarding his father's murder. [d. at 258-59. One of Ivan's 
internal voices does not want his father murdered. Ivan's second internal voice, however, 
does want his father murdered, but only if it occurs against Ivan's will because then Ivan 
would not feel remorse. This second voice-hidden for the most part from Ivan himself-is 
in essence a rejoinder to the first voice. Another character, Smerdyakov, only hears Ivan's 
second voice. However, in Ivan's external dialogues with Smerdyakov, Ivan answers with 
his first voice, which Smerdyakov takes to mean the opposite of what this voice seems to be 
saying. But Ivan's "voice that answers Smerdyakov is interrupted here and there by the 
hidden rejoinder of [Ivan's] second voice." The rich and complex texture of these internal 
and external dialogues exemplify the dialogic interactions that are, to Bakhtin, the hallmark 
of a polyphonic novel. 
39. [d. at 95. See also id. at 88. 
40. [d. at 98. 
41. [d. at 90. 
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polyphonic author replaces "the relationship of a single cognizant 
and judging 'I' to the world" with the "interrelationship of all these 
cognizant and judging 'I's' to one another.,,42 Put another way, 
the 
participatory orientation [of polyphony] takes another person's 
discourse seriously, and is capable of approaching it both as a 
semantic position and as another point of view. Only through 
such an inner dialogic orientation can my discourse find itself 
in intimate contact with someone else's discourse, and yet at the 
same time not fuse with it, not swallow it up, not dissolve in 
itself the other's power to mean; that is, only thus can it retain 
fully its independence as a discourse.43 
Polyphony thus rejects the misleading veneer of certainty 
embodied by the monologic tendency. The monologic mode does 
not merely constrict meaning into one perspective, but assumes that 
one perspective, that of the "carrier's", is the only right perspective. 
In contrast, by embracing polyphony and intensifying dialogue, 
discourse can become a rich medium "fraught with possibilities,,,44 
a stance with a mission to "reveal ever newer ways to mean.,,45 
III. The Polyphonic Model of Judicial Discourse 
According to Bakhtin, all understanding is dialogic. The 
monologic mode rejects this idea and operates under the fiction 
that there is a single, all-encompassing perspective. The polyphonic 
mode embraces the dialogic nature of meaning and seeks to 
intensify the elaboration of meaning "through intimate contact with 
another person's discourse." These ideas are a powerful means to 
analyze the current state of judicial discourse. 
A. The Judicial Opinion As Dialogue 
As the central tool through which judges elaborate meaning, 
opinions are dialogic. Opinions engage in a dialogue which 
includes practitioners, litigants, scholars, law students, other 
governmental actors, the general public and, perhaps most 
conspicuously, other judges. For example, judges interpret other 
opinions, examine their stories and modes of analysis, while citing, 
42. [d. at 100. 
43. PDP, supra note 12, at 64. 
44. [d. at 91. 
45. DI, supra note 14, at 346 (emphasis deleted). See also id. at 366-71. 
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limiting, overruling and otherwise commenting on what other 
judges have written.46 Opinions thus become part of a complex 
web of writers and readers who elaborate legal meaning. How a 
given judge characterizes "the law" is the result of this dialogue. 
Moreover, opinions embody a dialogue among parties. The 
adversary system presents judges with at least two perspectives 
which offer conflicting accounts of facts and law. Parties respond 
to adversaries and judges, and judges respond to adversaries. In 
this sense, litigation is dialogic. The parties and the judge or judges 
engage in a dialogue, with the judge assigned the role of bringing 
the dialogue to some sort of resolution which, under certain 
circumstances, is articulated in an opinion. 
In addition, while a voluntary settlement or judicially enforced 
resolution terminates litigation, the judicial dialogue is never 
finalized. Doctrine evolves over time. Conceptions of, for 
example, the First Amendment, due process, the Equal Protection 
Clause and the evolving interpretations of statutes are all reconfig-
ured and renewed under the power of historical change and shifting 
context-the essence of Bakhtin's "intense field of 
interorientations. ,,47 Thus, although definitive in form, opinions 
are exploratory in function. 
Finally, the judicial dialogue is, at least in theory, a heavily 
contextualized process. The classic conception of the jurisdictional 
requirement of an actual "case" and "controversy," and the related 
doctrines of standing, ripeness and mootness derived from it, insure 
that litigation presents a judge with a unique factual matrix.48 
46. See James Boyd White, What's An Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363,1367 
(1995) (a judicial opinion "connects cases across time and space" and "thus engages in the 
central conversation that is for us the law, a conversation that the opinion itself makes 
possible"). See also K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 49 (1930). 
{NJo case can have a meaning by itself! Standing alone, it can give you no 
guidance .... What counts, what gives you leads, what gives you sureness, that is 
the background of the other cases in relation to which you must read the one. 
They color the language, the technical terms, used in the opinion. But above all 
they give you the wherewithal to find which of the facts are significant, and in 
what aspect they are significant, and how far the rules laid down are to be trusted. 
Id. (emphasis in the original). 
47. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20. 
48. For a general discussion of the operation of these doctrines as a limitation on federal 
jurisdiction, see Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case" 
or "Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979); LAURENCE H. TRmE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67-69 (2d ed. 1988). 
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This coheres with the primacy of context in the dialogic elaboration 
of meaning. 
B. Polyphony As A Normative Goal For Judges 
Not only are opinions descriptively dialogic, but opinions, and 
the approach of judges who write them, should as a normative 
matter be more polyphonic. This is because polyphony addresses 
aspects of critiques of judicial decision-making and promotes the 
role opinions play in the legal system. 
1. Polyphony and Critiques of Judicial Decision-Mak-
ing.-Polyphony taps into recurring themes in both longstanding 
and current critiques of judicial decision-making. 
First, many commentators have called for a greater under-
standing by judges of the importance of their own perspectives and 
assumptions.49 Jerome Frank, in an oft-quoted passage, articulat-
ed this concern while a Second Circuit judge: "Much harm is done 
by the myth that, by merely putting on a black robe and by taking 
the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be human and strips 
himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless thinking 
machine.,,50 In this sense, Bakhtin's rejection of an abstracted, 
monologic perspective offers a means for judges to move beyond 
the fanciful (and impossible) image of "a passionless thinking 
machine.,,51 Polyphony is the antithesis of a false sense of a 
perspectiveless truth, and thus it promotes a greater sense of critical 
self-consciousness. 
Second, Bakhtin's ideas resonate with the contemporary 
emphasis in feminist, critical race and postmodern theory on 
49. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 3, at 216 (calling for "more concern for the projected 
assumptions in decision-making, and a deeper awareness of both the hidden perspectives and 
projected certitudes in the judicial voice"); Feldman, supra note 2, at 2278 ("critical theory 
must facilitate our penetration and understanding of ... sedimented layers of tradition, thus 
raising to the surface of consciousness at least some of our tacit prejudices and interests"). 
50. In re J.P. Linahan, 138 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1943). The "legal realists" offered a 
particularly scathing and influential critique of a mechanistic view of the law. See, e.g., 
LLEWELLYN, supra note 46; Jerome Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L.R. 645 (1932). 
51. Although few scholars, judges, or practitioners would take seriously the ideal of "a 
passionless thinking machine," the equivalent of this image continues to be evoked without 
irony by the Supreme Court. For example, Justice Kennedy recently noted that judges have 
"the acquired skill and capacity to disregard extraneous matters" through the exercise of 
"wisdom and good sense." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,562,565 (1994) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
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distinct "voices" and perspectives of others.52 Under this view, the 
judicial perspective is bounded by, among other things, class, race 
and gender. Given this limited perspective, judges tend to devalue 
unfamiliar perspectives. These unfamiliar perspectives, in turn, 
tend to belong to those groups who have been, and continue to be, 
underrepresented in the judiciary. Indeed, some commentators 
have noted that cases such as Dred Scott v. Sandford,53 Plessy v. 
Ferguson,54 Buck v. Belp5 and Korematsu v. United States56 all 
reduced the voice of oppressed groups into meaningless abstrac-
tion.57 Polyphony addresses this concern by valorizing the 
intensification of dialogue with as many ideas and individuals as 
possible.58 
Third, Bakhtin's vision vividly parallels Professor Robert 
Cover's characterization of law as either "jurispathic" or "jurisgene-
rative.,,59 The "jurispathic" function of the law ends dialogue and 
destroys other normative visions,60 precisely the impact of a 
52. See, e.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, 1HE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMIT 62 (1992) (an 
"ethical relation" is "a nonviolent relationship to the Other, and to otherness more generally, 
that assumes responsibility to guard the Other against the appropriation that would deny her 
difference and singularity"); Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and 
Reparations, 22 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) ("those who have experienced 
discrimination speak with a special voice to which we should listen"). Carol Gilligan has, of 
course, been a particularly influential advocate of the notion of a distinct "voice" based on 
gender. CAROL A. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). 
Interestingly, judges themselves have expressly asked for guidance on how the act of 
judging can accommodate the multiplicity of human voices. See Patricia Wald, Human Voice 
in Legal Discourse: Disembodied Voices-An Appel/ate Judge's Response, 66 TEX. L. REV. 
623, 628 (1988). 
53. 60 U.S. (19 HOw.) 393 (1857). 
54. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
55. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). This case sustained a state law providing for coerced 
sterilization of persons deemed mentally unfit. The opinion contains Holmes' infamous 
observation that "three generations of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207. 
56. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). For a detailed analysis of two of the opinions in Korematsu, 
see infra notes 92-113 and accompanying text. 
57. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narrative: Can Judges Avoid 
Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1929 (1991). See also infra notes 97-99, 187·92 and 
accompanying text. 
58. Feldman, supra note 2, at 2278 ("hearing the diverse voices of others encourages us 
to recognize the contingency of our own prejudices and interests, while on the other hand, 
we more easily appreciate the value of our own uniqueness in the community"). 
59. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1983). For a more recent consideration of Cover's ideas, 
see Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. 
L. REV. 1441 (1990). 
60. Cover, supra note 59, at 40-44. 
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monologic worldview. The notion of polyphony captures the 
essence of Cover's call for a "jurisgenerative" view that embraces 
other normative worlds.61 
Fourth, Bakhtin offers a sophisticated notion of how experi-
ence influences meaning. While critiques of legal reasoning have 
long accepted life "experience" as an essential element of judicial 
decision-making,62 polyphony transforms vague invocations of the 
importance of "experience,,63 into a set of concepts that leads to 
a vision of what judges can do to enrich their sense of meaning. 
Finally, Bakhtin offers a constructive, practical response to the 
challenge posed by postmodernism.64 It has often been noted that 
post-modernism deconstructs so thoroughly that it leaves only 
nihilism in its wake.65 Polyphony draws upon the dialogic process, 
non-finalizable and intensified with as many voices as possible, as 
a vehicle to enrich possibilities in meaning. 
2. Polyphony and the Need for Explanation, Guidance and 
Predictability.-Opinions, of course, function in the practical world 
of litigation. Three primary functions of opinions-explanation, 
guidance and prediction-would all be well served by polyphony. 
First, opinions are preeminently explanatory tools that explain 
to the community of interested readers why a given resolution is 
fair and based on law.66 Polyphony would enrich this explanatory 
Id. 
61. Id. at 68. 
62. See Smith, supra note 2, at 430-31. 
[O]ne must wonder ... whether anyone could devise a theory that is not grounded 
in experience. Try it for yourself: invent a theory that does not arise from or 
relate to anything in your experience. What would such a theory even address? 
Distributive justice in the Martian economy? Sexual relations in the sixth 
dimension? 
63. This idea is perhaps best evoked by recalling the seemingly endless repetitions of 
Holmes' famous aphorism that "the life of the law is not logic, but experience." HOLMES, 
supra note 9, at 1. 
64. Although variously described, postmodernism generally "seeks to rethink problems 
from a perspective that is nonuniversalist or 'local' in character, holistic, and discursive." 
Patterson, supra note 2, at 269. The work of Steven Winter offers a particularly compelling 
view of postmodernism and the law. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 59; Steven Winter, 
Confident, But Still Not Positive, 25 CONN. L. REV. 893 (1993). 
65. A valuable summary and exploration of this dilemma is Feldman, supra note 2. See 
also Daniel Barbiero, Agreeing To Disagree: Interpretation after the End of Consensus, 78 
GEO. L.J. 447 (1989). 
66. See White, supra note 46, at 1366-67. See also In Justice Breyer's Opinion, A 
Footnote Has No Place, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1995, at B18 (quoting Justice Stephen Breyer 
as saying that "the major function of an opinion is to explain to the audience of readers why 
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function. It would resolve a given case with as great an under-
standing as possible of the complexity of perspectives and the 
consequences of potential outcomes. Polyphony would also 
elaborate doctrine with the understanding that a given decision is 
contingent on facts and history.67 
In addition, explanation informed by polyphony might increase 
the legitimacy of the decision-making process both among litigants 
and among society at large. By embracing complexity and 
dialogue, both litigants and others might be less inclined to view 
opinions as embodying "winners" and "losers," or a "right" position 
and a "wrong" position. 
The open texture of the polyphonic model might also enhance 
the second and third functions of opinions-guidance for judges in 
resolving controversies and prediction for attorneys in anticipating 
the likely outcome of litigation.68 By revealing more of the 
competing concerns and modes of analysis entailed by decision-
making, readers of a polyphonic opinion might be better able to 
glean what led a court to a given decision. This is in striking 
contrast to the current mode of opinion-writing which conceals 
complexity behind a smooth monologic surface. 
In any event, the underlying assumption that opinions furnish 
rigid constraints as precedent is problematic. As Karl Llewellyn 
noted, "[t]here is no precedent that the judge may not at his need 
either file down to razor thinness or expand into a bludgeon.,,69 
Thus it is unlikely that a more polyphonic approach would be less 
constraining on future decision-makers given the minimal con-
it is that the Court has reached that decision"). 
67. It should also be noted that while any explanation finalizes conclusions as to a given 
case, finality does not necessarily mean that dialogue is finalized. Indeed, the elaboration 
of doctrine through precedent comprised of concrete "cases and controversies" presupposes 
that dialogue will continue. See PDP, supra note 12, at 95 (in a polyphonic "world even 
agreement retains its dialogic character, that is, it never leads to a merging of voices and 
truths in a single impersonal truth, as occurs in the monologic world") (emphasis in original); 
Feldman, supra note 2, at 2273 ("[ijf we are concerned with promoting political dialogue, 
then consensus should be viewed as but one moment in dialogue, not its end"); JEAN-
FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 65-66 
(1984) ("consensus is only a particular state of discussion"); RICHARD RORTY, Pragmatism, 
Relativism, and Irrationalism, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 172 (1982) (conceiving 
of agreement as the goal of conversation "mistakes an essential moment in the course of an 
activity for the end of the activity"). 
68. These two functions are considered together because an attorney predicts the 
outcome of litigation by assuming the role of a judge who is guided by precedent. 
69. LLEWELLYN, supra note 46, at 180. 
18 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1 
straints that currently bind existing decision-makers. Indeed, 
polyphonic opinions might prove to be even more constraining 
since their greater openness could make them less susceptible to 
either filing down or bludgeoning. 
C. The Judicial Opinion as Monologic Utterance 
Despite the virtues of a polyphonic model of judicial discourse, 
the typical judicial opinion does not fare well when examined in 
light of the normative goal of polyphony. Indeed, as currently 
conceived, a judicial opinion typically acts like a monologic crucible 
combining multiple perspectives into a "unified accent" in order to 
reach a final result.70 This unified accent subordinates not only 
the perspectives of the litigants, but the perspectives of other 
judges. Judicial opinions therefore do not invite debate but end it 
with authoritative finality. 
The concurring opinion by Justice Scalia in the recent Supreme 
Court affirmative action decision, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena,71 offers a virtually pure example of the genre. The majority 
in Adarand held that all racial classifications are subject to strict 
scrutiny under either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Scalia's concurring 
opinion is as follows:72 
In my view, government can never have a 'compelling interest' 
in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for 
past racial discrimination in the opposite direction. Individuals 
who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination 
should be made whole; but under our Constitution there can be 
no such thing as a creditor or debtor race. That concept is alien 
to the Constitution's focus upon the individual, and its rejection 
of dispositions based on race or based on blood. To pursue the 
concept of racial entitlement-even for the most admirable and 
benign of purposes-is to reinforce and preserve for future 
mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race 
privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are 
just one race here. It is American.73 
The monologic qualities of Justice Scalia's opinion are legion: 
70. See Ferguson, supra note 3, at 204-08; Hersch, supra note 11, at 48. 
71. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
72. I have omitted citations and a brief opening and concluding sentence that are not 
pertinent here. 
73. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118-19 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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1. It is decontextualized.-lustice Scalia is setting forth an 
abstract view of the Fourteenth Amendment applicable under all 
circumstances. In doing so, he invokes a single set of governmental 
"eyes" and a single constitutional "focus," metaphors that recall the 
unitary "spirit of a nation" and "spirit of a people" that Bakhtin 
cited as paradigms of an abstract, and therefore monologic, 
worldview.74 However, there is neither one set of "eyes" that 
views all citizens as of one race nor a single constitutional "focus" 
on the individua1.75 In fact, the concept of "affirmative action" 
interacts with "equal protection of the laws" through a complex 
and inconsistent contemporary understanding contingent on source 
and perspective.76 In light of this, Justice Scalia's ultimate conclu-
sions are not necessarily wrong, but his profound reductionism 
cannot be right. 
2. There is no recogmtLOn of the validity of alternative· 
ideas.-Whatever one's personal opinion about affirmative action, 
as an issue, it is complex and vexing.77 Nevertheless, Justice 
Scalia's concurring opinion ignores even the possibility that an 
exploration of the issue extends beyond how affirmative action is 
"alien" to the Constitution. In other words, there is one voice, the 
monologic voice, and it swallows up other perspectives into its own 
unified "accent. ,,78 
3. The right decision is a matter of compulsion, not 
discretion.-Justice Scalia is not choosing among reasonable 
alternatives. Any recognition that things could go either way is 
anathema. To Justice Scalia, there is one interpretation of 
74. PDP, supra note 12, at 82. 
75. As Justice Ginsburg points out in her dissenting opinion in Adarand, "for most of 
our Nation's history, the idea that 'we are just one race' was not embraced." 115 S. Ct. at 
2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Horwitz, supra note 8, at 68. 
76. See generally Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
77. Indeed, the sheer number of opinions filed in Adarand-Justices O'Connor, Scalia, 
Thomas, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg all filed separate opinions-demonstrates how 
difficult affirmative action cases are to resolve. 
78. This is not to say that all monologic opinions wholly ignore points made in other 
opinions in any given case. However, in a monologic opinion, "[d]ifferences from the 
speaking voice in the judicial opinion are raised only to be answered by it." Ferguson, supra 
note 3, at 205. For an analysis of how this strategy operates in a mono logic opinion, see 
infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
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precedent and history, the right one, and this interpretation 
compels only one result.79 
4. It is authoritarian.-Despite the prevailing conception of 
judge as neutral and detached decision-maker,so this concurring 
opinion is written from the perspective of an advocate. Justice 
Scalia's client is a bounded set of ideas about affirmative action. 
He has written about these ideas before,S! and he is engaged again 
in writing what is tantamount to a polemic about them. His 
confidence in the accuracy of his own views is palpable. 
5. It invokes a unitary past.-Justice Scalia's opinion invokes 
a unitary past, what Bakhtin called a single "spirit of history.,,82 
There is no sense "that the complexity of the past can justify a 
variety of conclusions."s3 
Indeed, events surrounding the adoption of the Equal 
Protection Clause are themselves a stark demonstration of the 
misleading historical reductionism of Justice Scalia's opinion. The 
history of the Clause is a muddled confusion that supports any 
number of conclusions.s4 One's view of the Clause's ambiguous 
history is contingent on a range of variables that contribute to a 
selective reading of the historical record.s5 These factors might be 
mutually inconsistent or they might reinforce each other. They 
might be shared or not shared with others. Any asserted "spirit of 
history" is thus a unique formulation by one individual in one 
context at one point in time. 
79. See Ferguson, supra note 3, at 207 (a judicial opinion "must ... appear as if forced 
to its inevitable conclusion by the logic of the situation and the duties of office, which 
together eliminate all thought of an unfettered hand"). 
80. See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. 
81. See, e.g., Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
82. PDP, supra note 12, at 82. 
83. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 214. 
84. For example, one historian has noted that "[v]oluminous evidence has been 
presented in support of both the expansive and narrow readings of the Fourteenth 
Amendment" and concludes that "[c]onfusion and contradiction abound" in the ambiguous 
historical record about the Amendment. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTII 
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE To JUDICIAL DOCfRINE 4 (1988). 
85. Indeed, it is well established that individuals construe evidence to validate 
preexisting beliefs. See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text. 
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Nevertheless, Justice Scalia conjures up an immutable past 
which trumps a messy contested present.86 This invocation seeks 
to place the contested present beyond dialogue and thus is starkly 
monologic.87 
6. It is jinalized.-Justice Scalia does not recognize that 
discourse should continue on the issue of affirmative action. 
Rather he equates the holding of a case with finalization of 
dialogue.88 
While Justice Scalia's opinion represents monologic opinion-
writing in virtually pure form, its pervasive monologic qualities 
accurately represent the prevailing norm.89 Opinions tend to be 
polemics in support of an idea or cluster of ideas. Few opinions 
embrace a true interplay of ideas or recognize that diverse and 
sometimes inconsistent conceptions have independent validity. 
D. Elements of a Polyphonic Opinion 
Although the monologic opinion typifies the current state of 
judicial discourse, some judges have written opinions which do 
embody elements of polyphony. Dissenting opinions from 
Korematsu v. United States90 and Callins v. Collins91 illustrate 
such a polyphonic approach. 
1. Korematsu v. United States.-Korematsu v. United States, 
the majority opinion of which is now almost universally con-
demned,92 presented the issue of whether the forced exclusion of 
86. 01, supra note 14, at 342-44. See also ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS: THE 
REPRESENTATION OF REALITY IN WESTERN LITERATURE, 3-23 (1953). This aspect of 
Justice Scalia's monologic opinion recalls the use of history in epic literature, in which the 
world "was projected ... into a valorized past of beginnings and peak times" which are 
"distanced, finished and closed like a circle." 01, supra note 14, at 19. 
87. Invocations of "original intent" are another example of this type of monologic 
analysis. The concept of original intent presupposes that: (1) different framers all thought 
the same thing; (2) each individual framer had a single articulable "intent"; and (3) each 
intent-to the extent there was a unitary intent-remained constant over time. See generally 
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE OEBA TE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Ralcore 
ed.,1990). 
88. See supra text accompanying note 26. See also supra note 67. 
89. See Ferguson, supra note 3, at 204-08; Hersch, supra note 11, at 48. 
90. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
91. 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994). 
92. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 4, at 1379. See also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2136 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (characterizing Korematsu as "yield[ing] a pass for an odious, 
gravely injurious racial classification"). 
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Japanese-Americans from certain geographic areas during World 
War II violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.93 The exclusion order had the effect of forcing affected 
persons from their homes.94 
Elements of the familiar monologism of Justice Scalia's 
Adarand concurrence95 are evident in Justice Black's majority 
opinion in Korematsu. Justice Black adopts almost exclusively the 
voice of "the properly constituted military authorities [who] feared 
an invasion of our West Coast.,,96 These "authorities ... felt 
constrained to take proper security measures.,,97 The studied 
blandness of this monologic voice swallows up any hint of the pain 
felt by victims of the exclusion orders. 
Moreover, the monologic voice which pervades Korematsu 
preserves its unitary character by dismissing discordant perspectives 
as irrelevant or misleading. For example, any investigation of the 
circumstances present at the "relocation centers" is unnecessary: 
"[r]egardless of the true nature of the of the assembly and 
relocation centers ... we are dealing specifically with nothing but 
an exclusion order.,,98 Any attempt to question the motives of the 
military authorities is an inappropriate use "of the calm perspective 
of hindsight.,,99 In perhaps the most striking of all these monol-
ogic rejections, Justice Black wrote that "[t]o cast this case into 
outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military 
dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. 
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of 
hostility to him or his race. ,,100 The monologic voice, as the sole 
carrier of meaning in the opinion, cannot admit the validity of a 
discordant voice. Needless to say, this "confusing" voice happened 
to be that of the victims. 
In fascinating contrast, Justice Murphy's Korematsu dissent 
approaches a polyphonic ideal.lOl As opposed to a monologue of 
military necessity, the dissent manifests a remarkable sensitivity to 
different perspectives. 
93. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 221. 
94. [d. at 220. 
95. See supra text accompanying notes 71-89. 
96. [d. at 223. 
97. [d. 
98. [d. 
99. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 224. 
100. [d. at 223. 
101. [d. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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Like the majority, Justice Murphy hears the voice of the 
military. This dissent recognizes that there was "a very real fear of 
invasion of the Pacific Coast, accompanied by fears of sabotage and 
espionage in that area. ,,102 He admits that the military's actions 
might have been "well-intentioned,,103 and were related to "mat-
ters ... vital to the physical security of the nation."l04 He even 
admits "that there were some disloyal persons of Japanese descent 
on the Pacific Coast who did all in their power to aid their 
ancestralland.,,105 
However, unlike the majority, Justice Murphy does not view 
the perspective of the military authorities as a unitary voice of 
concern speaking to the nation's security. To the contrary, he 
hears voices that "fall[] into the ugly abyss of racism."l06 For 
example, Justice Murphy quotes a report by the Commanding 
General which characterizes Japanese-Americans "as belonging to 
'an enemy race' whose 'racial strains are undiluted.",l07 Justice 
Murphy also cites the testimony of the military Commanding 
General before a congressional subcommittee: 
"I don't want any of them [persons of Japanese ancestry] here. 
They are a dangerous element. There is no way to determine 
their loyalty . . . It makes no difference whether he is an 
American citizen, he is still a Japanese .... [W]e must worry 
about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the 
map."l08 
In addition, Justice Murphy incorporates the perspectives of 
others who supported the relocation. For example, he quotes the 
president of a trade association that would have benefitted 
economically as a result of the internment: "'We're charged with 
wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons .... We do. It's 
a question of whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or 
the brown men. ",109 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Justice Murphy 
individualizes the victims, many of whom were children and the 
102. Id. at 235. 
103. [d. at 240. 
104. Korematsu, 323 US. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
105. [d. at 240. 
106. [d. at 233. 
107. [d. at 236. 
108. [d. at 236 n.2. 
109. [d. at 239 n.12 (alteration in original). 
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elderly.l1O He recognizes that the supposedly menacing concen-
tration of Japanese-Americans near "strategic points" was the 
result of "economic, social and soil conditions" including "[l]imited 
occupational outlets and social pressures .... "111 He cites social 
science literature to conclude that fears about espionage were 
based on "misinformation, half-truths and insinuations that for 
years have been directed against Japanese Americans by people 
with racial and economic prejudices .... "112 
Justice Murphy's opinion thus embodies a dialogue among 
voices. While, to be sure, he vigorously supports his position, there 
is a rich, multi-vocal quality to his narrative which is lacking in the 
majority opinion.ll3 Such a multiplicity of perspectives approach-
es the polyphonic ideal. 
2. Callins v. Collins.-Another illuminating contrast can be 
seen between the two opinions, one by Justice Scalia and one by 
Justice Blackmun, relating to the denial of certiorari in the capital 
case of Callins v. Collins. This case gained attention because 
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, concluded for the first time that 
the administration of capital punishment violates the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.114 
The familiar monologism of Justice Scalia is once again 
apparent in his Callins' concurrence. Calling Justice Blackmun to 
task for his dissent, Scalia's concurrence invokes two voices that are 
consistent. One is the disembodied "text and tradition" of the 
Constitution which establishes "beyond doubt" that capital 
punishment is constitutional.ll5 The other is the voice belonging 
to the victims of capital crimesY6 All other perspectives are 
"false."l17 There is thus no hint of complexity or tension in the 
110. Id. at 242. 
111. Id. at 238 n.9. 
112. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 239. 
113. Korematsu also illustrates that polyphony is not synonymous with "liberal." 
Polyphony is "liberal" only insofar as, at this moment in time, dominant monologic 
perspectives tend to be associated with "conservative" judicial philosophies, but this is not 
inevitably so. Korematsu itself is a good illustration: Justice Douglas, who is generally 
considered to be one of the most "liberal" Supreme Court justices of the twentieth century, 
joined the majority opinion written by Justice Black, a fellow "liberal." 
114. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
115. Id. at 1127. 
116. Id. at 1128. 
117. Id. 
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OpInIOn. Indeed, like his Adarand concurrence and Justice Black's 
majority opinion in Korematsu, this opinion's simplicity is its most 
salient characteristic. 
Justice Blackmun's dissent is strikingly different. 118 First, like 
Justice Murphy's Korematsu opinion, this dissent embodies a 
variety of voices, some of which are in tension with each other. 
Justice Blackmun alludes to society's legitimate "demand for 
punishment,,119 as well as public opinion in favor of the death 
penalty.120 The dissent also recognizes, however, that these voices 
overwhelm those in society who "speak in too faint a voice to be 
heard .... ,,121 Indeed, Justice Blackmun saves capital defendants 
from hazy abstraction by recalling the "staggering evidence of racial 
prejudice" in sentencing,122 the images of an actual scene of 
execution123 and the identity of the capital defendants (including 
those who have colorable claims to innocence,124 the mentally 
retarded125 and juveniles ).126 
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun openly acknowledges "struggl[-
ing]" with the issue over time.127 This openness translates into a 
recognition that this opinion is contingent on time and experi-
ence-two themes that constantly recur in the opinion.128 Indeed, 
he admits that "[p ]erhaps one day this Court will develop" a 
constitutionally permissible capital sentencing scheme129-a 
recognition of potential fallibility that is unthinkable in both Justice 
Scalia's concurrence and monologic opinions generally. 
118. Id. at 1128 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
119. Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1136. 
120. Id. at 1131. 
121. Id. at 1136 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting». This phrasing recalls Bakhtin's call to listen to perspectives beyond "the loud, 
recognized, reigning voices of the epoch." See supra text accompanying note 41. 
122. Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1135. 
123. Id. at 1128. 
124. Id. at 1138 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993». 
125. Id. at 1137 n.6 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989». 
126. Id. at 1137 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989». This concretization 
extends beyond the identity of defendants to a vivid description of the responsibilities borne 
by all actors involved in the adjudication of capital cases, including judges, prosecutors, and 
defense attorneys. Id. at 1128-29. 
127. Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1130. 
128. See id. at 1129-30, 1132, 1134. In the space of two pages, the opinion mentions four 
times how "[t]wenty years have passed since" Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The 
word "experience" recurs three times in the opinion. See Collins, 114 S. Ct. at 1129, 1132, 
1134. 
129. Id., at 1138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
26 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1 
Finally, and perhaps most distinctively, Justice Blackmun 
makes no effort to hide from complexity. This is manifested not 
only in how he recounts his own, as well as the Court's, struggle to 
elaborate meaningful and fair guidelines for capital punishment, but 
also in his recognition of the turbulence and complexity of the 
decision-making process itself. As he puts it, "experience has 
taught" that capital sentencing decisions are "rife with all of life's 
understandings, experiences, prejudices, and passions .... "130 
This phrase not only describes the behavior of "the sentencer" at 
a capital trial, but also the complexity that Justice Blackmun 
acknowledges in his own decision-making. 
Justice Blackmun has thus performed his own "small-scale 
Copernican revolution" by abdicating "an abstract and fixed 
external position."131 Instead, he infuses his decision-making with 
understandings, experiences, prejudices, and passions-a polyphony 
of ideas and perspectives. 
IV. The Cognitive Challenge of Polyphony 
The opinions of Justices Murphy and Blackmun demonstrate 
that a polyphonic approach to judicial decision-making is attainable. 
However, the mere acceptance of polyphony as a worthwhile goal 
does not end the inquiry. To the contrary, profound challenges 
face any attempt to move beyond the monologic tendency because 
the act of cognition is itself a simplifying process. This does not 
mean, of course, that judges, or anyone else, are "biologically 
determined" to be monologic. However, it does mean that there 
is a wide array of cognitive processes which, often without our 
conscious knowledge, serve to reduce and stabilize meaning and 
inspire confidence that we are "right" and others are "wrong." 
While these are obviously sobering conclusions, these processes 
also offer insights into how to approach polyphony. First, an 
understanding of how cognition simplifies meaning might diminish 
the certainty with which we hold to our own beliefs. This repre-
sents a necessary first step towards polyphony. Second, as 
discussed in Part V,132 these processes themselves suggest possible 
strategies that judges can employ to become more polyphonic. 
130. [d. at 1134-35. 
131. See PDP, supra note 12, at 49. See also, supra text accompanying notes 35-38. 
132. See infra notes 169-86 and accompanying text. 
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A. Cognitive Conservatism 
Without an ability to build upon preexisting interpretations of 
events, humans would expend vast amounts of mental energy 
interpreting anew each circumstance confronted or life would, in 
William James' phrase, be '''a bloomin' buzzin' confusion.",133 In 
order to avoid either of these fates, humans construct meaning 
through "knowledge structures.,,134 These structures, which 
include schemata,135 scripts136 and narratives,137 provide short-
133. Quoted in THOMAS s. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTlFlC REVOLUTIONS 113 
(Otto Nevrath et al. eds., 2d vol. 1970). 
134. In a famous statement, Jerome Bruner in 1957 noted that a perceiver interprets 
meaning by "going beyond the information given." Jerome S. Bruner, Going Beyond the 
Information Given, in CONTEMPORARY ApPROACHES TO COGNITION 41 (Howard E. Gruber 
et al. eds., 1957). This statement is often cited as the beginning of the "cognitive revolution." 
See Dale W. Griffin & Lee Ross, Subjective Construal, Social Inference, and Human 
Misunderstanding, in 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 319, 320~21 
(Mark P. Zann ed., 1991). As later described by Bruner, the essence of the cognitive 
revolution "was to discover and to describe formally the meanings that human beings created 
out of their encounters with the world, and then to propose hypotheses about what meaning-
making processes were implicated." JEROME S. BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 2 (1990). 
135. RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 38 (1980). 
136. Scripts are defined as background knowledge, the sort of "normal expectations" 
about people and experience that we all carry around in our heads. JEAN M. MANDLER, 
STORIES, SCRIPTS, AND SCENES: ASPECTS OF SCHEMA THEORY 94, 108 (1984). The seminal 
theoretical work positing the existence of scripts is ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P. 
ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS AND UNDERSTANDING: AN INQUIRY INTO HUMAN 
KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES (1977). 
137. Recent scholarship explores how narrative operates cognitively. Although 
traditionally thOUght of as "representing" reality, narrative may also be a means "not only 
of representing but of constituting reality." Jerome S. Bruner, The Narrative Construction 
of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 5 (1991). See also Katherine Nelson, ed., NARRATIVES 
FROM THE CRIB (Katherine Nelson ed., 1989); JUDY DUNN, THE BEGINNINGS OF SOCIAL 
UNDERSTANDING (1988). 
There is now a vast literature exploring how narrative influences legal meaning. Some 
commentators have explored narrative in relation to advocacy. See, e.g., Anthony G. 
Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories About Them, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 9 (1994) (oral 
arguments); Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 
681 (1994) (briefs). Others have focused on how judges and juries employ narratives to 
decide cases. See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis, The Proverbial Woman, 48 REC. ASS'N B. CITY 
N.Y. 7 (1993); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision 
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991). Narrative has also furnished 
a foundation for how law is defined. See Cover, supra note 59. at 4. There has also been 
an explosion of the use of narrative as the form for legal scholarship, particularly among 
scholars identified with the critical race theory and feminist jurisprudence movements. See 
e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal 
Narratives,45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993). 
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cuts and simplifications that avoid the necessity of analyzing every 
aspect of every situation presented for interpretation.138 These 
presuppositions, or "heuristics", are comprised of cultural norms 
and individual experience.139 
Such cognitive heuristics profoundly influence how we think. 
For example, people tend to overestimate the normativityl40 and 
accuracyl41 of their own beliefs. Through what is called "confir-
mation bias," we "manage knowledge in a variety of ways to 
promote the selective availability of information that confirms 
judgments already arrived at.,,142 Through "biased fact assimila-
tion," we interpret facts consistent with those we already be-
lieve.143 Additionally, through "biased hypothesis testing" we 
subject evidence supporting hypotheses with which we do not agree 
to far greater scrutiny than evidence supporting hypotheses to 
which we are sympathetic.l44 
138. For general applications of these concepts to judicial decision-making, see John R. 
Allison, Ideology, Prejudgment, and Process Values, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 657, 691-94 
(1994); Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 8-20 (1994). 
139. NISBETT & Ross, supra note 135, at 34. See also DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS 
TvERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman 
et aI. eds., 1982). The Nisbett & Ross and the Kahneman & Tversky resources are 
influential surveys of these heuristics. For a useful summary of more recent research in this 
area, see Griffin & Ross, supra note 134. 
140. Id. at 337-38. One study showed "that in a survey of preferences and beliefs ... the 
subjects who made a given choice estimated the commonness of that choice to be greater 
than did subjects who made the opposite choice." Id. at 337. 
141. See, e.g., Derek J. Koehler, Hypothesis Generation and Confidence in Judgment, 20 
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 461 (1994); Asher Koriat 
et aI., Reasons for Confidence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUMAN LEARNING & 
MEMORY 107 (1980). 
142. Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal 
History, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 603, 606 (1980). Studies have also shown that "even when 
the entire evidential base of newly formed theories is discredited the social theory is left 
virtually intact." Craig A. Anderson & Elizabeth S. Sechler, Effects of Counterexplanation 
on the Development and Use of Social Theories, 50 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 24, 
25 (1986) (citations omitted). 
Some recent studies have reframed "confirmation bias" in terms of "positive test 
strategy," through which people "overweight confirming results and underweight 
disconfirming results." Derek J. Koehler, Explanation, Imagination, and Confidence in 
Judgment, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 499, 512 (1991). 
143. Griffin & Ross, supra note 134, at 348-50. See also Lord et aI., Biased Assimilation 
and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories On Subsequently Considered 
Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979) [hereinafter Lord et aI., Biased 
Assimilation]. 
144. Lord et aI., Considering the Opposite: A Co"ective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 
J. PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1232 (1984) [hereinafter Lord et aI., Considering 
the Opposite); Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Hypothesis Testing Processes in Social 
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The stereotype is another example of resource-preserving 
heuristics.145 Stereotypes provide ready interpretations of the 
behavior of others without the necessity of analyzing individuating 
characteristics or circumstances. l46 Stereotypes are also another 
aspect of confirmation bias; we are likely to interpret evidence 
about people to conform with an implicated stereotype.147 
These tendencies demonstrate, at a minimum, that humans are 
cognitive conservatives.l48 Humans reach conclusions on a variety 
of matters-legal, political and social-and adhere to them in order 
to avoid repeatedly having to think about them anew.149 Once 
we reach conclusions, our mind acts to reaffirm what we already 
believe.15o This extends to the retention of existing beliefs even 
after the invalidation of the original evidence that fostered these 
beliefs.151 
B. The Interplay of Monoiogism and Cognitive Conservatism 
There is a nexus between cognitive conservatism and the 
monologic tendency in judicial opinions. The stubborn persistence 
of beliefs reduces complexity into simple "truths," one of the 
essences of monologic opinions.152 Moreover, cognitive conserva-
tism inhibits the consideration of alternative ideas through the 
appearance that they are self-evidently "wrong." In other words, 
cognition simplifies meaning and then instills confidence that one's 
own simplification is "right." 
Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL. 1202 (1978). 
145. For an excellent recent summary of research on stereotypes, see Charles Stangor & 
James E. Lange, Mental Representations of Social Groups: Advances in Understanding 
Stereotypes and Stereotyping, in 26 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 
(1994). 
146. See Macrae et aI., Stereotypes as Energy-Saving Devices: A Peek Inside the Cognitive 
Toolbox, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL. 37 (1994). In addition to preservation of 
cognitive resources, some researchers have also found that people tend to stereotype their 
own group positively and groups to which they are not a part negatively as a mechanism to 
enhance self-esteem. Stangor & Lange, supra note 145, at 357-58. 
147. See Ronald A. Farrell & Malcolm D. Holmes, The Social and Cognitive Structure 
of Legal Decision-Making, 32 Soc. Q. 529, 532-33 (1991). 
148. Greenwald, supra note 142, at 606. 
149. See id. See also Anderson & Sechler, supra note 142, at 32. 
150. For an influential account of how this principle applies to scientific inquiry, see 
KUHN, supra note 133. 
151. Lord et aI., supra note 144, at 1240; Koehler, supra note 142, at 501. 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44. 
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Moreover, there is a twist to the interplay of cognitive 
tendencies and judicial opinion writing: opinions promote as well 
as embody a mono logic world view. The reason for this lies in the 
impact of opinion writing itself. Through a well-established process 
called "explanation bias," the very act of explaining a decision 
convinces the explainer of its accuracy and "truth.,,153 Thus, as 
a result of writing an explanation, "a certain inertia sets in, which 
makes it more difficult to consider alternative hypotheses.,,154 
This interplay between cognition and the monologic opinion 
has important consequences for attaining polyphony. Due to 
cognitive conservatism, people tend to be simplifiers and reducers 
who are then confident of the truth of their simplifications and 
reductions. The conventional monologic opinion further inhibits 
discourse by intensifying an unshakable belief in the truth of the 
written analysis and shutting down the consideration of alternative 
hypotheses. This is likely to carryover to future opinions address-
ing similar issues. Indeed, as one judge has noted, "[t]he same 
issues recur in cases over the years, and [judges] tend to think 
about them in the same ways.,,155 
Thus, it is not surprising that unexamined assumptions about 
gender,156 race157 and economic status158 have all profoundly 
influenced the development of legal doctrine. Similarly, it is hardly 
surprising that judges are typically writers of monologic opinions. 
C. Polyphony in Light of Cognitive Conservatism 
It is seductive to view cognitive conservatism as generating 
"distortions" which, like myopic vision, can be easily corrected. 
However, these processes are not distortions, but rather a "prereq-
uisite to perception itself. ,,159 In other words, at least to a certain 
153. See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 142. 
154. Id. at 503. As Koehler explains, cognitive conservatism drives this heuristic as well: 
"Because of the practical limits on our processing abilities and on our time, we cannot 
continue indefinitely in an exhaustive search for all possible hypotheses." Id. at 512. 
155. Wald, supra note 4, at 1385. Moreover, analyses of United Supreme Court opinions 
demonstrate how consistently voting patterns conform to preexisting ideological values. See, 
e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of u.s. Supreme 
Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989). 
156. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 137, at 7; Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term: 
Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987). 
157. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 76. 
158. See, e.g., Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 
79 OEO. L.1. 1499 (1991). 
159. Kuhn, supra note 133, at 113. 
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extent, we are simplifiers not by choice, but because we are built 
that way. 
Moreover, the unconscious nature of cognitive conservatism 
intensifies the difficulty of strategies designed to achieve greater 
polyphony.l60 As humans, we assume that what we see is the 
truth without any recognition that our "previous visual-conceptual 
experience" actually defines what we see.161 Indeed, evidence 
suggests a built-in overconfidence factor through which we feel that 
others interpret the world subjectively, while our own interpretation 
is the "right one.,,162 
This suggests that achieving polyphony requires more than an 
act of will. Even a sincere attempt to reach out to other perspec-
tives might fall victim to unconscious tendencies that simplify 
meaning and reaffirm what we already believe. Indeed, studies 
have demonstrated that exhortations to be "fair and impartial" 
have little or no effect on the operation of cognitive heuristics l63 
and, presumably, on the monologic tendency as well. 
Thus, a judge would do well to avoid the classic ideal of "a 
detached magistrate presiding over a dispute in which he or she has 
neither personal interest nor predisposition."l64 This model 
presupposes that judges can simply "put aside . . . predisposi-
tions".165 Yet, this is an impossibility in light of Bakhtin's dialogic 
model and current theories in social psychology.l66 Instead, 
judges should seek out creative ways to reveal presuppositions as 
presuppositions and thereby open up new possibilities of meaning. 
160. Stangor & Lange, supra note 145, at 357. 
161.· Kuhn, supra note 133, at 113. 
162. Griffin & Ross, supra note 134, at 354. 
163. Lord et aI., supra note 144, at 1231. Indeed, conscious attempts to eliminate 
stereotyping result in a "rebounding" effect through which the stereotype reemerges with 
even greater force. C. Neil Macrae et aI., Out of Mind but Back in Sight: Stereotypes on the 
Rebound, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (1994). 
164. Jack Weinstein, Limits on Judges' Learning, Speaking, and Acting: Part II Speaking 
and Part III Acting, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1,5, n.16 (1994). 
165. Yagman v. Republic Insurance, 136 F.R.D. 652, 656-58 (C.D. Cal. 1991). See also 
del Vecchio v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1372-73, (7th Cir. 1994) 
(although judges, "like all humans," have "their outlooks ... shaped by their lives' 
experiences," they are nevertheless "capable of overcoming those influences and rendering 
evenhanded justice"). 
166. Most scholars also do not take this ideal very seriously. Robert A. Ferguson, for 
example, makes the point that the most radical critique of the image of the detached 
judge-that of the critical legal studies movement-manifests a "more general apprehension" 
about this concept in current models of judicial decision-making. Robert A. Ferguson, Law 
and Political Culture: Holmes and the Judicial Figure, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 506, 513 (1988). 
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V. Life Drawn Out of Its Usual Rut: Judicial Calisthenics 
The simplifying force of cognition throws into doubt the 
endlessly repeated convention that judges maintain an "open mind" 
as a means to administer "even-handed" justice. "Open minds" 
risk reaffirming and simplifying pre-existing "truths," the hallmark 
of closed discourse and the conventional monologic opinion.167 
The challenge, then, is to construct an alternative orientation that 
judges can pursue in order to embrace a more polyphonic approach 
to decision-making. 
The idea of polyphony suggests an alternative, albeit an 
unconventional one. Instead of aspiring to a meaningless ideal of 
"detachment," judges can, as Bakhtin put it, promote "eccentricity, 
the violation of the usual and the generally accepted, life drawn out 
of its usual rut."l68 Such a strategy of destabilization would infuse 
decision-making with dialogue and experience and thus new 
possibilities of meaning. 
The following proposals are, in a sense, destabilizing strategies 
for the intellect. They originate from diverse sources, including 
legal scholars, social psychologists, advocates and judges them-
selves. In the spirit of polyphony itself, the proposals are necessari-
ly speculative and provisional. Their efficacy is contingent upon, 
among many other things, shifting context, individual frames of 
reference and practical constraints. Rather than being definitive, 
they are themselves a set of possibilities for encouraging a greater 
sense of possibility among decision-makers. 
A. Considering the Opposite 
Cognitive conservatism entails viewing facts in a manner 
congruent to existing beliefs-what social psychologists call "biased 
fact assimilation.,,169 For example, as revealed in his Adarand 
dissent, Justice Scalia most likely evaluates arguments in favor of 
affirmative action with a hypercritical skepticism because they do 
not fit into his monologic view about history and the meaning of 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
167. See supra text accompanying notes 159-66. 
168. PDP, supra note 12, at 126 (emphasis deleted). See also id. at 105. 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 140-44. 
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One potential strategy to overcome this tendency is called 
"considering the opposite" or "counterexplanation.,,170 The 
strategy promotes the systematic consideration of alternative ideas 
by turning rigid knowledge structures upside-down. 
For example, in one experiment, subjects who had earlier 
expressed either support or opposition to capital punishment were 
given one study purportedly demonstrating the deterrent effect of 
capital punishment and another study purportedly demonstrating 
that capital punishment had no such effect. l7l Subjects were told 
that they should be "as objective and unbiased as possible" and to 
consider themselves "to be in the same role as a judge or juror 
asked to weigh all of the evidence in a fair and impartial man-
ner."m Nevertheless, subjects interpreted the studies as well 
done and convincing in a manner congruent to their prior opinions 
on the issue.173 Indeed, the subjects' review of the studies further 
polarized their attitudes.174 . 
A "consider the opposite" instruction largely neutralized these 
effects.175 This instruction asked subjects to appraise "at each 
step whether you would have made the same high or low evalua-
tions had exactly the same study produced results on the other side 
of the issue.,,176 Such an instruction significantly diminished 
attitude-congruent evaluations of the study177 and attitude polar-
ization after reading the study.178 
In addition, "considering the opposite" not only undermines 
overconfidence in the rightness of one's own view, but also 
stimulates consideration of a range of alternative views, including 
ones not specifically considered in executing the strategy.179 
Thus, by destabilizing meaning and turning accepted ways of 
170. See generally Lord et aI., supra note 144. The usefulness of this strategy is well 
established in the experimental literature. See, e.g., Anderson & Sechler, supra note 142; 
Edward R. Hirt & Keith D. Markman, Multiple Explanation: A Consider the Alternative 
Strategy for Debiasing Judgments, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL. 1069, 1070 (1995); 
Koehler, supra note 142, at 502; Koriat et aI., supra note 141, at 107 (demonstrating the 
effectiveness of contradictory reasoning during the decision-making process). 
171. See generally, Lord et aI., supra note 144. 
172. [d. at 1233-37 (emphasis in original). 
173. [d. at 1233-34. 
174. [d. at 1234-36. 
175. [d. 
176. Lord et aI., supra note 144, at 1233-34. 
177. [d. at 1234. 
178. [d. at 1236. 
179. Hirt & Markman, supra note 170, at 1084. 
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viewing legal doctrine on its head, considering the opposite might 
serve, as one study put it, to "break the inertia"l80 and infuse 
decision-making with possibility and exploration.181 
Despite its potential, however, effective use of a "considering 
the opposite strategy" is not an easy process. The strategy requires 
active consideration of "opposites" and construction of justifications 
for such results.l82 Given the powerful influence of biased fact 
assimilation,183 merely listening or reading opposing arguments, 
even with a self-imposed goal of maintaining an "open mind," is 
not enough. l84 
Of course, there are a number of ways for judges to "consider 
the opposite." One potentially effective but impractical technique 
would be to write an opinion that resolves a controversy in a 
manner that differs from the likely "decision." A less time-
consuming alternative would be to sketch out opposite results as 
opposed to writing them out in a full opinion. However, perhaps 
the most realistic way to "consider the opposite" is to incorporate 
the essence of the strategy into the very act of writing opinions. 
While current opinions typically address alternative analyses in 
order to discredit them,185 writers of opinions should explicitly 
draft alternatives and view them as real alternatives. This process 
of writing the opposite might serve to destabilize monologic 
"truths" and thereby expand the scope of what is possible.186 
180. [d. 
181. See id. In addition, considering the opposite might diminish the tendency of the 
monologic judge to assert that the judge has no discretion in reaching a decision because the 
law "compels" a given result; this "judicial cannot" often masks the real choices to be made 
through a purported (and fictitious) lack of discretion. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
See also Horwitz, supra note 8, at 117 (The Supreme Court has increasingly "resort[ edj to 
mechanical jurisprudence ... to avoid coming to terms with the deepest challenges that 
modernism has presented"); COVER, supra note 7, at 232-36 (describing how pre-Civil War 
judges externalized responsibility for the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law by claiming 
that they were mechanistically applying formal principles). 
182. Koriat et aI., supra note 141. at 117. 
183. See supra text accompanying note 143 
184. Koehler, supra note 141, at 467 (demonstrating that subjects have shown greater 
overconfidence in relation to tasks involving hypothesis evaluation as opposed to hypothesis 
generation). 
185. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100. 
186. Of course, time constraints might make this strategy impractical as well. However, 
at least as far as the United States Supreme Court is concerned, this might be less of a 
problem because of declining numbers of cases disposed of by written opinions. Compare 
Statistical Recap of Supreme Court's Workload During Last Three Terms, 54 U.S.L.W. 3038 
(July 30, 1985) (in the 1984-85 term, 170 cases were decided by signed or per curiam 
opinions) with Statistical Recap of Supreme Court's Workload During Last Three Terms, 64 
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B. Idimtification with Parties 
Another strategy would entail active identification with those 
affected by litigation. Such identification is neither an easy task 
nor commonly recognized as certtral to the judicial role. l87 Never-
theless, such a projection might destabilize "the usual and the 
generally accepted" and humanize the impact of judicial decision-
making.188 
A good example of this strategy is the argument of Homer 
Plessy's attorney in Plessy v. Ferguson: 189 
Suppose a member of this court, nay, suppose every member of 
it, by some mysterious dispensation of providence should wake 
to-morrow with a black skin and curly hair ... and in traveling 
through that portion of the country where the 'Jim Crow Car' 
abounds, should be ordered into it by the conductor. It is easy 
to imagine what would be the result ... What humiliation, what 
rage would then fill the judicial mind!l90 
This statement expressly invites the consideration of another 
perspective-the perspective of Homer Plessy (or that of 
Korematsu which Justice Black found to be "confusing"). Such a 
U.S.L.w. 3094 (Aug. 8, 1995)(in the 1994-95 term, 94 cases were decided by signed or per 
curiam opinions). Such declining decision calendars might also permit less reliance on the 
work of clerks. This is, of course, essential because the strategy is meaningless if clerks write 
opinions embodying preordained results. 
187. As Robert Cover noted, it is "most uncharacteristic of judges, to project [themselves] 
into the place of the petitioners." COVER, supra note 7, at 255. 
188. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 57, at 1952 ("[M]ost serious judicial mistakes 
result from the judge's inability to empathize with the litigants or their circumstances"); 
Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1576 (1987) (ciaiming 
that legality and empathy are not mutually exclusive); Martha C. Nussbaum, Poets as Judges: 
Judicial Rhetoric and the Literary imagination, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1477, 1488-89 (1995) 
(calling for judges to engage in "sympathetic imagining" as an aid to decision-making). See 
also RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY xvi (1989) (calling for 
"increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other, 
unfamiliar sorts of people" as a means to "make[] it more difficult to marginalize people 
different from ourselves by thinking, 'They do not feel it as we WOUld"') (emphasis in 
original). 
189. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). This example is from Minow, supra note 156, at 59-60. 
190. Brief for the Plaintiff, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), reprinted in CIVIL 
RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO 298, 303-04 (A. Blaustein & R. Zangrando eds., 1968). 
Thurgood Marshall employed comparable strategies during oral argument in Brown v. Board 
of Education. See ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA 1952-55,36-51,61-68 (Leon Friedman ed., 
1969). For an analysis of Marshall's Brown argument, see Henderson, supra note 187, at 
1593-1609. 
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perspective might set ideas in motion and lead to a richer concep-
tion of meaning. Moreover, this type of projection saves "separate 
but equal" and "equal protection of the laws" from hazy abstrac-
tion. Although it is, of course, impossible to know the impact of 
this specific argument, it is possible that it led Justice Harlan, as the 
sole Plessy dissenter, to recognize that the statute at issue was 
designed "not so much to ... exclude colored people from coaches 
occupied by or assigned to white persons,,,191 but as "a badge of 
servitude. ,,192 
Such empathy was distinctly lacking in the universally 
condemned cases of Dred Scott, Buck v. Bell and Korematsu. 193 
Such a lack promotes monologic abstraction and vast simplification 
which in turn creates a state of affairs that leads to reductionism 
that, like Justice Scalia's Adarand concurrence, cannot be right. 
C. Expand Life Experience 
Polyphony embraces "a participatory orientation" as a means 
to intensify dialogue and thereby enrich meaning.194 Judges 
should therefore reject isolation in favor of an affirmative effort to 
experience the unfamiliar. There are at least three possible 
strategies that may contribute towards reaching this goal. 
1. Attend Court Out of Role.-The bench is physically and 
metaphorically above the litigants. Justice Shirley Abrahamson of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court attended court out of role and has 
urged other judges to follow suit.195 She went to court wearing 
casual clothes and without identifying herself because she recog-
nized that as "Ms. Justice," she would be treated "royally and 
ushered into chambers.,,196 Instead, she found that she was 
treated rudely and condescendingly by attorneys and court 
personnel alike. 197 
191. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
192. [d. at 562. 
193. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57. 
194. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
195. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Woman Has Robes: Four Questions, 14 GOLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. 489, 497-98 (1984). Judith Resnick offers a feminist perspective on this 
experience in Judith Resnick, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for 
Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1928-29 (1988). 
196. Abrahamson, supra note 195, at 497-98. 
197. [d. 
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Although entailing difficult (but not insurmountable) problems 
for Supreme Court justices whose faces are of course well.known, 
visits by judges incognito to courtrooms offer an otherwise 
unattainable experiential perspective. As Judith Resnick has 
written, this exercise will permit judges "to understand more clearly 
how much [a judge's] position of power affects her own construc-
tion of courtroom reality.,,198 
2. Experience the Voices of Others.-In addition, judges could 
affirmatively seek out the voices of others. This entails not merely 
lecturing, reading, attending conferences or discussing questions 
with colleagues. l99 Rather, the best approach might be to "bring 
the world closer and familiarize it in order to investigate it 
fearlessly and freely.,,200 
Louis Brandeis suggested such a possible strategy to his 
colleague Oliver Wendell Holmes. Holmes recounted the conversa-
tion as follows: 
Brandeis the other day drove a harpoon into my midriff with 
reference to my summer occupations. He said ["]you talked 
about improving your mind, you only exercise it on the subjects 
with which you are familiar. Why don't you try something new, 
study some domain of fact. Take up the textile industries in 
Massachusetts and after reading the reports sufficiently you can 
go to Lawrence [Massachusetts] and get a human notion of how 
it really is[,,].201 
Perhaps Brandeis' idea is more generalizable. Judges might 
seek to visit "outsider" neighborhoods not ordinarily part of the 
judge's experience. These visits would not be that of a judge; they 
198. Resnick, supra note 195, at 1929. This strategy recalls a rich religious and secular 
literature in which characters gain wisdom through abrupt changes in social status or 
supernatural metamorphoses. See, e.g., ApULEIUS, THE GOLDEN Ass (Jack Lindsay trans., 
1962); THE BUDDHIST TRADmON IN INDIA, CHINA AND JAPAN 60-68 (William Theodore 
de Bary ed., 1969). Bakhtin also alludes to this idea by describing "the adventure plot" in 
Dostoyevsky: "It places a person in extraordinary positions that expose and provoke him, 
it connects him and makes him collide with other people under unusual and unexpected 
conditions precisely for the purpose of testing the idea." PDP, supra note 12, at 105 
(emphasis in original). See also id. at 114-15. 
199. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges Learning, Speaking, and 
Acting-Part I-Tentative First Thoughts: How Many Judges Learn?, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 539 
(1994). 
200. 01, supra note 14, at 25. 
201. 2 HOLMES-POLLACK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES 
AND SIR FREDERICK POLLACK 1874-1932, 13 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1946). 
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would be of one human being trying to understand the perspectives 
of others. As Brandeis suggested, such visits could be in conjunc-
tion with reviewing literature expressing "alien voices," views and 
opinions with which the judge is either unfamiliar or had rejected 
long ago.202 
Perceptions· of these circumstances would, of course, still be 
colored by confirmation bias.203 Nevertheless, even such summa-
ry dialogic interaction would, perhaps, contextualize seemingly self-
evident truths and help to individuate members of stereotyped 
groupS.204 
3. Witness Consequences of Judicial Actions.-ludicial acts are 
by their nature a kind of legitimized violence; they compel transfers 
of money, imprisonment or death.205 Understanding these 
consequences may promote polyphony by concretizing abstraction 
and individualizing the impact of litigation?l6 
As a practical strategy, justices should thus witness the 
consequences of their actions. This might include unannounced 
visits to prisons and witnessing executions or evictions. It is, for 
example, inconceivable that any informed decision can be made 
about whether capital punishment is cruel and unusual without an 
202. Matsuda, supra note 52, at 325 (arguing that judges should "study[] ... the actual 
experience of black poverty and listen[] to those who have done so"). See also Delgado & 
Stefancic, supra note 57, at 1952 (arguing that "counter- or 'saving' narratives could 
conceivably serve as strong antidotes to serious moral error"); Rorty, supra note 188, at xvi 
("[T]he process of coming to see another human being as 'one of us' rather than as 'them' 
... is a task not for theory but for genres such as ethnography, the journalistic report, the 
comic book, the docudrama, and, especially, the novel."). However, as Delgado and 
Stefancic incisively point out, "outsider" texts are often viewed as "political" because of the 
very fact that they are "outsider" texts and thus are not part of the literary canon. Delgado 
& Stefancic, supra note 57, at 1955. Of course, the realization that works that are currently 
part of the canon were, at one time, viewed as subversive, might provide something of a 
deeper sense of the changing context of social reality. 
203. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44. 
204. Henderson, supra note 188, at 1650. See also Stangor & Lange, supra note 145, at 
392 ("It is known that increasing familiarity with a target group increases the likelihood that 
representations will be formed around persons or around subgroups rather than around the 
broader social level category.") (citations omitted). 
205. See generally Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). 
206. See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING To AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 237-38 (1989) (arguing that the judicial reliance on abstract principles and 
failure to be aware of "the hurt of being treated as an outsider who doesn't belong" has 
enabled law to be an instrument of social inequality). Cf Richard L. Revesz, Specialized 
Couns and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1157 (1990) 
(arguing that "the absence of intercircuit stare decisis" promotes "experiential dialogue by 
observing the consequences of different legal rules on the parties affected by such rules"). 
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understanding of what capital punishment actually is and how it 
works.207 
D. Recognize the Situated Nature of Judges 
The monologic tendency operates under a fiction that the 
judicial perspective is not bounded and situated, but a way to 
pursue an absolute truth.208 In contrast, polyphony recognizes 
that any decision is, at most, a hypothesis about meaning at one 
point in time situated in a continuing dialogue.209 
Put in more prosaic terms, judges and the opinions that they 
write should reflect a humility about the complexity of the judicial 
undertaking. Doubt, not overconfidence, should be the hallmark 
of the search for meaning. Learned Hand proposed one means to 
promote doubt: "'I beseech ye in the bowels of Christ, think that 
ye may be mistaken.' I should like to have that written over the 
portals of every church, every school, and every courthouse ... in 
the United States.",210 
Perhaps a more effective strategy is to study the history of the 
development of doctrine. Such an investigation would demonstrate 
that truths formerly viewed as "self-evident" are embodied in 
rhetorically persuasive opinions that, in light of contemporary 
207. Judge Alex Kozinski has recently written about his own struggles in coming to tenns 
with deciding capital cases and his failure to witness an execution: 
Though I've now had a hand in a dozen or more executions, I have never 
witnessed one .... I sometimes wonder whether those of us who make Iife-and-
death decisions on a regular basis should not be required to watch as the 
machinery of death grinds up a human being. I ponder what it says about me that 
I can, with cool precision, cast votes and write opinions that seal another human 
being's fate but lack the courage to witness the consequences of my actions. 
Alex Kozinski, Tinkering with Death, NEW YORKER, Feb. 10, 1997, at 52. 
208. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34, 71·88. 
209. See supra text accompanying notes 36-45, 118·3!. 
210. Lord et al., supra note 144, at 1231 (quoting Judge Learned Hand). The same 
sentiment occasionally appears in Hand's judicial opinions as well. See, e.g., Fishgold v. 
Sullivan Drydocks & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785, 791 (2d Cir. 1946) ("[t)he fact that we are 
ourselves not agreed cautions us that we should not be too sure of our conclusion"). This 
sentiment resembles the approach of the physicist Richard Feynrnan: 
"Great value of a satisfactory philosophy of ignorance," Feynman jotted on a 
piece of notepaper one day, "teach how doubt is not to be feared but welcomed." 
This became his credo: he believed in the primacy of doubt, not as a blemish upon 
our ability to know but as the essence of knowing. 
James Gleick,lntroduction to RICHARD FEYNMAN, CHARACTER OF PHYSICAL LAW x (Mod. 
Libr. ed., 1994). 
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morality, rest on appalling assumptions. 211 This highlights the 
danger of subordinating complexities into a finely wrought 
argument. As Clifford Geertz has noted, "[t]he force of our 
interpretations cannot rest, as they are now so often made to do, 
on the tightness with which they hold together, or the assurance 
with which they are argued.,,212 
VI. Conclusion 
The judge's voice is one voice, but as the voice with the power 
to impose its will, the judicial mission should be to embrace as· 
many conceptions of meaning as possible. Judges should thus try 
to preside over a polyphonic courtroom where equally valid voices 
engage in an intense dialogic interaction. Mere desire to do this is 
not enough. Rather, judges should seek out extraordinary 
intellectual and experiential situations so as to better explode 
assumptions and find "new ways to mean." Such an intense 
exploration of meaning-enriched with as many ideas, experiences, 
and perspectives as possible-might make for a less classically 
"persuasive" opinion, but perhaps a richer and truer one. 
211. See supra text accompanying notes 93-99. See also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 
57, at 1930 ("Because of the particularized stock of life experiences and understandings 
judges bring to the bench," even decisions which are later universally condemned "seemed 
to their authors unexceptional, natural, 'the truth. "'). 
212. GEERTZ, supra note 1, at 18. 
